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THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
Basil Ugochukwu*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Nigeria would have been an independent nation for thirty-
five years, having severed from the British monarchy on October 1,
1960. Since independence, civilians have been in political power for a
combined period of ten years while the military has dominated the
remaining twenty-five years. The result of Nigeria's unfortunate
romance with military dictatorship has been disastrous and it is still
manifest by the day. Political, economic and social stability and
coherence have continued to elude the country. Social structures and
institutions have manifested varying degrees of collapse. The country
is fast acquiring the image of a pariah in an international community
justifiably bewildered at the squandering of her enormous potentials.
Personal insecurity has heightened considerably.
Recently, social and political tensions have risen sharply since
Nigeria's dictatorship has continued to hedge and waiver on the issue
of returning the country to civil democratic rule. There has been
intense agitation for change - to which the military political authorities
have given one response: repression. Human rights violations have
escalated to proportions never before witnessed in the history of the
country. Ironically, while these violations occur, avenues for redress
have been disempowered by draconian military decrees that forbid the
courts of their jurisdiction to check the exercise of arbitrary power. It
is against this background that one must view the operations of
Internal Security Forces in Nigeria.
The State Security Service, (SSS), is one of several internal
security forces in Nigeria. It was a creation of the military. Among
the other internal security forces, there are: the police, the Directorate
of Military Intelligence (DMI), the Nigerian Prison Services, the
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and the Nigerian
Board of Customs Services, all of which exercise either military or
quasi-military powers. Apart from the police, which (probably
Staff Attorney, Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), Lagos, Nigeria.
71
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1996-97
because of its history and colonial origin) is the most dominant arm,
the SSS exercises a wide range of internal security powers. Like the
police, they are also responsible for widespread violations of human
rights.
A. Historical Background
The State Security Service in Nigeria did not have a colonial
origin. Before its establishment in 1976, as the Nigerian Security
Organisation (NSO), it was generally believed that the police and the
various security branches of the armed forces were capable of
maintaining political stability and public security.
The political unrest of 1964 in Western Nigeria, the military coup
of January 1966 and the counter coup in July of the same year did not
change this perception nor did the thirty-month civil war that ended in
January 1970. The establishment of the NSO, as a secret service
organisation, has been traced to the unfortunate event of February 13,
1976: the brutal killing, by a group of disgruntled solders, of Nigeria's
Head of State, General Murtula Mohammed, in an attempt to take over
government.
Although, this military coup was crushed, General Olusegun
Obasanjo, who succeeded Mohammed, hurriedly constituted an
intelligence organisation independent of those then involved in
intelligence information gathering for the government.' The
impromptu nature in which the NSO was established did not leave
room for adequate preparation. It was, in fact, the existing Special
Branch of the Police that metamophorised into the NSO, complete
with personnel. These men suddenly found themselves managing both
intelligence information gathering and security functions for the
Obasanjo regime. Their training was neither adequate nor
commensurate with the tasks to be fulfilled. The police influence and
heritage thus became a huge inhibiting factor on the NSO especially,
on its role perception.
These included the Service Intelligence Corps of each of Nigeria's three military services - the
Army, Navy and Air Force; the Police Criminal Investigation Bureau, the Research arm of the Ministry of
External Affairs and the Special Branch of the Cabinet office.
2 Takaya Bala ed.; Security Administration and Human Rights: Prospects for Nigeria's Third
Republic CDS, Jos 1989.
INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN NIGERIA
Decree No 16 of 1976, which set up the NSO, said the organisation
was employed for the following purposes:
a) the prevention and detection of any crime against the security
of Nigeria;
b) the protection and preservation of all classified matter 3
concerning or relating to the security of Nigeria; and
c) such other purposes, whether within or without Nigeria, as the
Head of the Federal Military Government may deem necessary
with a view to securing the maintenance of the security of
Nigeria.
The decree recognised the powers of the Head of State to make
provisions by instrument relating to such matters as the structure,
designation, appointment and administration of the organisation as
well as the manner in which its powers can be exercised. It also
provided that specific officers of the organisation were to be conferred
with the powers of "superior police officers."4
However, the instruments to be made by the Head of State
containing its operational orders, although having the effect of
Decrees, were prohibited from being published in the gazette. Thus,
facts relating to the basic structure and standing orders of the NSO
remained secret, and this secrecy came to characterise the entire work
of the NSO.
The activities of the NSO and the fluid nature of its mandate
strengthened its image as an agency whose role covered all aspects of
security activities, exercising powers:
. to obtain by secret sources or other means accurate intelligence
regarding persons or organisations whether within or outside
Nigeria, engaged in acts of espionage, subversion or sabotage
against Nigeria, or engaged in acts which may threaten the security
of Nigeria;
* to identify and where appropriate apprehend or assist in the
apprehension of persons believed to have committed any crime
3 Defined in Section 9 of the Nigerian Official Secrets Act, Chapter 335 Laws of the Federation
(1990), as "any information or thing which, under any system of security classification from time to time
in use by or by any branch of the government, is not to be disclosed to the public and which the disclosure
to the public would be prejudicial to the security of Nigeria.".
4 Section 2 of the Nigerian Police Act defines a Superior Police Officer as any officer above the rank
of a cadet assistant superintendent of police and by section 28 (1) of the same Act he can effect an arrest
and can also authorise the search of premises.
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against the security of Nigeria. The operational orders of the NSO
also laid down the following assignments;
* to collect, collate, assess and disseminate intelligence
information affecting Nigeria's state security and the maintenance
of public order;
* to detect and investigate all acts of subversion, espionage and
sabotage against the country;
* to maintain records of individuals and organisations engaging
in subversive activities;
* to investigate the reliability of persons who may have access to
classified information or material and who may be employed in
sensitive or scheduled posts;
* to advise and assist in the implementation of protective security
measures in government establishments and sensitive installations;
and
* to provide personal security to very important personalities.
5
B. The NSO in Action
For the ten years of its existence, the NSO laboured under the
problem and circumstances of its sudden establishment. The
Organisation lacked needed materials for its intelligence work, which
hindered its effectiveness. More importantly, the fact that it was
established in reaction to the assassination of the Head of State
permanently predisposed its operatives to seeing themselves as
protectors of the regime in power. Its police heritage fuelled a
complacent attitude to its role as did the inadequate training of its staff
for which it relied mainly on the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps
Training School (which is structured for basic intelligence and not
sophisticated training).
The above notwithstanding, its operational area was very
extensive, it covered the range of both the CIA and FBI in the United
States. Despite this, according to one writer: "in practice the NSO
degenerated into an organisation concerned merely with the survival of
the regime in power instead of with national security".6
5 Takaya Bala, supra note 2.
6 d.
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Not long after its establishment, under General Obasanjo, the NSO
started arresting individuals who had the courage to criticise
government policies, clamping then into jail. A number of lecturers in
the Universities of Ibadan and Calabar, inclined to the leftist
philosophy and regarded as being unpatriotic on the advice by NSO,
were either blacklisted or discharged.
Under civilian rule, between 1979 and 1983, the ruthlessness of the
NSO persisted. The organisation was used to silence opposition
political groups and individuals. Even the military was not spared, as
some of its members presumed to be real or potential coup planners
were put on the watch list. Several of them were in fact, "retired."
This did not stop the military from toppling the civilian government on
December 31, 1983.
Under Buhari and Idiagbon, who succeeded the civilian
administration, the NSO came to acquire an even more notorious
image as a vendetta organisation. Exploiting the provisions of the
preventive detention decree promulgated by the regime, the NSO
virtually turned into a law unto itself. Former politicians and office
holders became victims of harassment, intimidation and long-term
detention without trial. Journalists, social commentators and several
others became increasingly constrained by the NSO in their activities.
NSO cells brimmed with numerous detainees held mainly on un-
substantiable grounds. Consequently, Nigeria now represented the
classical image of "Big Brother watching you."
8
When Buhari and Idiagbon were themselves overthrown by
General Ibrahim Babagida in August 1985, the situation had
deteriorated badly. So terrible was it, that to buy public acceptance
and legitimacy, Babangida had to make a public spectacle of the NSO
cells. In the words of one national journal: "A television camera
showed the nation the horror of the National Security Organisation,
NSO, whose operatives gave a new but chilling meaning to the word,
gestapo".
9
Babangida promised that his government would respect human
rights, because of his belief that "the individual can only be at his best
7 The victims then included Comrade Ola Oni, Omafume Onoge, Bade Onimode, Wale Adeniran
and Akin Ojo all of University of lbadan and Edwin and Bene Madunagu of University of Calabar.Takaya Baa, supra note 2, at 23.
9NEWSWATCH, August 29, 1988.
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to contribute to the upliftment of the society when he can operate
without fear of intimidation in a congenial legal environment. 1 This
notwithstanding, he warned that his government would not allow the
propagation of human rights to degenerate into irrational expressions
that border on subversion.II
C. Reorganisation of the Intelligence Services
A year after he became President, Babangida caused a
reorganisation of the intelligence services when he signed the National
Security Agencies Decree No. 19 of June 5, 1986 into law. Under this
law, the NSO was split into three agencies each with its own mandate.
The three agencies are:
* The Defence Intelligence Agency, (DIA), with responsibility to
detect and prevent crimes of a military nature against the security
of Nigeria and to protect and preserve all military classified
matters concerning the security of Nigeria both within and outside
the country.
* The National Intelligence Agency, (NIA), which is responsible
for the general maintenance of the security of Nigeria outside the
country in matters that are related to military issues particularly on
issues pertaining to intelligence outside Nigeria.
* The State Security Service, (SSS), charged with the task of
detecting and preventing within Nigeria any crime against the
internal security of Nigeria and the protection and preservation of
all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security
of Nigeria.
The activities of these agencies come under a co-ordinator
appointed under the Decree whose responsibility it is to advise the
Head of State on matters concerning the intelligence activities of the
agencies. He also makes recommendations in relation to the activities
of the agencies to the Head of State as circumstances warrant. The co-
ordinator is also involved in correlating and evaluating intelligence
reports on national security and providing the appropriate
'o From an address to the National Conference on Law Development and Administration held at
Abuja in September 1987.
1 Maiden broadcast to the nation on August 27, 1985.
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dissemination of such intelligence within the government using
existing facilities and determining the number and level of staff,
especially in the transfer and posting of existing staff of the NSO.
The National Security Decree ostensibly transferred the mandate of
the then NSO to the State Security Service, as their functions were
similar. Apart from this fact, the role perception of the SSS has not
been different from that of the defunct NSO. The creation of the SSS
under the 1986 arrangement has instead strengthened its use as an
oppressive arm of the government against so-called critics and
detractors. Thus, "national security," for which it was originally
employed has been distorted to actually mean "government security."
Though there have not been any reports dedicated particularly to the
SSS and its exercise of security powers in Nigeria, there is evidence of
consistent and gross violations of human rights as a result of the
exercise of these powers. Most of the cases are well known to the
public.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE STATE
OF SECURITY SERVICE
Nigeria is, de jure, a federation of states with a central government
and smaller units called local councils. This notwithstanding, under
the military the country operates a de facto unitary government
characterised by a strong powerful central authority and weak,
subservient state governments. The SSS was created under the later
dispensation and has a strong central command. Though there are
state directorates, they are all accountable to the national office in all
operations.
The SSS, at the centre, is headed by a principal officer who is
designated as Director General. He is directly responsible and
accountable to the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces. The structure of the organisation has been influenced
over the years by military practices that by their nature reject
consultation.
This fact has significant implications and says much about the
character of military dictatorships in Nigeria. Once the military took
over power, it abolished the various civil legislative assemblies and
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placed legislative powers in the federal military government. 12 At the
centre a military council, headed by the Commander in Chief issues
decrees, while in the states, legislative authority lay with the military
governors or administrators, as the case may be, who exercise that
authority through edicts. Under Ibrahim Babangida, who resigned due
to internal political pressure in August 1993 and under whose
dictatorship the SSS was created, the military council was named
Armed Forces Ruling Council, (AFRC). Babangida, during this
period, combined military and presidential powers and after he
arrogated to himself the power to dissolve the AFRC, he concentrated
unprecedented executive and presidential powers in his hands.13
Abacha, the incumbent dictator, has retained this arrangement with
the military council, now styled the Provisional Ruling Council,
(PRC). Consequently, whereas under a civilian regime, legislative and
executive powers are separate, under the military regime both powers
are fused together into one body, the military council and presently in
one individual, the Head of State.
A. Authority to Create ISFs
Before the military coup of December 31, 1983, which saw the
dissolution of the civilian regime and the coming into power of the
military, the authority to make laws regarding internal security forces
was vested in the National Assembly comprising the Senate and House
of Representatives.' 4  The National legislature was empowered to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the federation
or any part thereof and also had powers to regulate the police and other
internal security forces.
As earlier indicated, this was altered under the military. The
National Security Agencies Decree of 1986, which created the SSS,
was promulgated in an arbitrary manner without consultation or input
from Nigerians or the legislature. Section 7 of the Decree placed it
above the Constitution, when it provided that, "If any other law,
12 See for example the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 made by
the Abacha regime.
13 Basil Ugochukwu, et al., Suppression As Law: The Arbitrary Use Of Military Decrees In Nigeria
4 (Published by the Constitutional Rights Project [CRP] October 1994).
14 Section 4 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
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including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979) is
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree, the provisions of this
decree shall prevail and that other law shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency be void."
I The command structure, appointments and general organisation of
the SSS are not provided for in the National Security Agencies Decree
of 1986. The Director General of the SSS is also a member of the
National Defence and Security Council, an advisory body that along
with the National Defence Council assists in determining the work of
all Nigeria's intelligence agencies. Coordinating the activities of these
agencies is an officer designated as Co-ordinator on National Security
who is also a principal staff officer in the office of the Head of State.
Apart from the Head of State, the Provisional Ruling Council, (PRC),
also has powers to determine certain matters related to the activities of
the SSS.
Consequently, the command structure of the SSS in Nigeria
presently is represented as follows:
Head of State
Provisional Ruling Council
National Defence and Security Council
Co-ordinator on National Security
Director-General State Security
Service
State Directors
Others
Section 6(1) of the Decree provides that the Head of State may by
instrument under his hand make provisions as to the following: the
structure of the SSS and the manner in which it is to be administered,
how its powers are to be exercised as well as the conferment of powers
to superior police officers on some of its specified operatives. This
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instrument, under the hand of the Head of Stafe, has the same effect as
a decree yet cannot be published in the Gazette. 15 This implies that
such issues and facts as powers, personnel, staffing, ranks, authority to
discipline, operational orders and regulations pertaining to the SSS, are
hidden from the public.
B. Power of the SSS
Although the National Security Agencies Decree refers to
"powers" of the SSS and the other intelligence agencies, there is no
further reference to the precise nature of these "powers." In Nigeria,
the SSS exercises most of the powers available to the police - arrest,
search, detention, interrogation - but no one knows from which law or
body of laws these powers are derived. Similarly, the decree provides
that some SSS officers may be conferred with the powers of superior
police officers, which includes powers of arrest and search. There is
no indication as to what criterion informs the conferment. Its limits
are equally imprecise. These facts have discouraged legal and other
challenges against abuses of powers by its officers. Absence of
accountability has in turn led to widespread, institutionalised
violations of human rights.
The activities of the SSS cover all plans, acts and schemes that
threaten the security of the state. The fluidity of the term "state
security" has, however, become a catchall, making every act of
political opposition or dissension a security issue. While laws
purporting to guarantee "state security" are widespread, what
constitutes state security has never been defined or explained.
For example, the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree No.
2 of 1984 as variously amended, authorises the Chief of General Staff
or Inspector General of police to issue warrants for the detention of
persons who are or have been concerned with acts prejudicial to state
security or have contributed to the economic adversity of Nigeria or
are planning to instigate such acts. A suspect can be detained for six
months in the first instance without trial, charge or bail. The Decree
nowhere defines the term "state security."
15 Section 6(2).
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In a majority of cases where the SSS had in the past injuriously
exercised its powers to protect state security, Nigerian courts have held
that their power to offer redress is limited. Where, for instance, an
arbitrary detention has occurred, the courts have held that their power
does not extend further than establishing that the detaining authority
had acted in good faith.
The courts have advanced two arguments to support their position.
First, they cannot intervene in cases of improper exercise of security
powers because issues calling for consideration of the exercise of the
powers are "political," hence non-justiciable. Second, facts giving rise
to the exercise of security powers are generally hidden from the public
and it is not in the national interest that they be disclosed.
The test of what constitutes a threat to state security, therefore,
shifts with each allegation. It appears that the assumption is that the
donee of the power to detain for acts inimical to state security has an
"emergency discretion."'16 It may mean actions at variance with the
"national objective,"'17 action opposed to the national interest,'8
irrational expression that borders on subversion 19, radicalism,
publishing stories that embarrass the government, being an agent for
foreign interests20 and so on. The interpretation given to this class of
actions is subject to the interest of the government in power, the
tendency being for the incumbent regime to assume that national
security, interest or objective are co-extensive with its continued stay
in power. Persons alleged to be involved in such action, usually
comprising opposition politicians, critics of government policies,
human rights activists, student, journalists, labour groups and such
other individuals or organisations, are frequently visited with
repression and denial of rights. When the Babangida government
closed the Concord Group of Newspapers on April 19, 1992, the state
security agents who carried out the closure first accused African
Concord, a magazine, of going against "the interest of the nation." But
16 See for example Gbenga Komolafe v Attorney General of the Federation, Suit No.'
FHN/LIM59/89.
17 Who Funds Them? NEWSWATCH, October 21. 1991, at 17.
's Pin in the Bomb-Stack; NEWSWATCH, November 10, 1986.
19 See footnote 11 supra.
20 Refer to the case of Etim Etim, then of The Guardian, p. 28.
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in explaining this, they said "no government will accept a situation
where the people are incited against her."
This practice has been adopted also by the junta presently in
power. On August 24, 1994, the junta's former Information Minister,
Jerry Gana, while replying to a letter written to him by journalists in
Lagos protesting induced "occupational hazards" faced by journalists
in Nigeria said,"... [T]he closure of media houses were actions taken by
the security agencies in the national interest... You will agree with me
that no responsible government will fold its arms while matters that
can cause panic or unrest among the people are being freely
circulated."
C. Control of the SSS
The question of who controls the SSS in Nigeria is difficult to
answer. There are at the governmental level, for instance, several
persons and bodies of persons who make imputes into the activities of
the organisation. Consonant with the military practice, all these
persons and bodies of persons belong to the executive arm of the
dictatorship. The Head of State and Commander in Chief is the Chief
Accounting Officer. There are also the Provisional Ruling Council
(PRC), the National Defence and Security Council, (NDSC), the Co-
ordinator on National Security and the Director General. The buck,
however, stops on the Head of State's table.
It has been argued that security forces are not created simply to
provide law enforcement in the abstract or to act in blind obedience to
the commands of the government of the day but to advance the cause
21
of a constitutional order. In Nigeria, where no such constitutional
order exists in fact and in which international interments are ratified
not of conviction but out of political expediency and reaction to
international pressures, blind obedience to orders is the norm in
practice. During periods of democratic rule in Nigeria, national
security forces are to varying degrees subject to legislative oversight.
The sanction of the legislature was required to support appointments
into major offices of the internal security forces including the NSO,
22 James C.N. Paul, Human Rights and the Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional Orders:
The Case of Ethiopia; 3 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 252 (1994).
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which later became the SSS under the military. To this extent, the
sovereignty of the people over the ISFs acquired formal validation.
Military regimes on the other hand, no matter how benevolent or
liberal, represent the direct opposite of this condition. Policies are
enunciated and implemented capriciously without any regard to
popular imput or consultation. The orientation and disposition of the
SSS in Nigeria assumes that the security of the state and popular
control and regard for human rights are incompatible. Under the guise
of securing the state, atrocities are committed, all of which pass un-
redressed.
In the absence of a constitutional order, international instruments
including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which have been
ratified by Nigeria, should provide a rich source of controlling norms.
Expectations of Nigerians on this have repeatedly been dashed.
Various laws are made constraining application of human rights
principles and practices while at the same time conferring more
discretionary powers on the internal security forces.
D. The Role of the Judiciary
The judiciary should play a central role in the control of internal
security forces, especially in providing redress for oppressive conduct
of security agents. The Nigerian Constitution of 1979 contains in its
fourth chapter, fundamental human rights. This is patterned after a
similar section of the American Constitution. The sections set forth
various rights and freedoms to which individuals are entitled as well as
legally permitted limitations and derogations from the guaranteed
rights and freedoms. Nigerian courts are by the Constitution permitted
to inquire into and redress actual or threatened violations of these
rights and freedoms.
Under the military, however, the Constitution and its provisions on
human rights are subjected to absolute and arbitrary exercise of
legislative and executive powers. Fundamental rights and freedoms
are either specifically denied by decrees, or the courts are prohibited
from inquiring into violations that have occurred in fact or may occur.
Consequently, the judiciary is often rendered irrelevant and is most
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times unable to offer any remedies for the violations of rights arising
from the activities of internal security forces.
Among the various decrees presently in force in Nigeria are
Decrees 107 of 1993 and 12 of 1994. The former decree prohibits the
courts from entertaining any question as to the validity of any decree
or edict made by the military22 while the latter decree - The Military
Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree - gives
absolute and unchallengeable powers to the dictatorship. It provided
in section 2(i) that "no civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any
court for or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done
or purported to be done or pursuant to any decree or edict and if such
proceedings are instituted, before, or after the commencement of this
decree, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and made void."
In a recent report, Constitutional Rights Project, CRP, identified
thirty-seven laws which exclude the human rights provisions in the
Constitution, all of them promulgated by the military and as many as
forty-one legislative acts which oust the purisdiction of the courts to
inquire into cases of human rights abuses. 2
Apart from the withdrawal by legislation of the powers of the
courts to address human rights violations, the military has also
exhibited an alarming penchant to disobey court orders which tend to
vindicate individual rights. Court rulings are contemptuously
contravened while in some cases retroactive decrees are issued to
prevent the enforcement of unfavourable court decisions against the
government.
In Olisa Agbakoba v Director, State Security Service24 , the Court
of Appeal sitting in Lagos held that the seizure of Mr Agbakoba's
passport by agents of the SSS on his way to The Netherlands in 1992
was a violation of his right to movement guaranteed by both the
Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights. The court also made an order for the seized passport to be
returned to Mr Agbakoba. The order was flouted and the passport
could only be released on the intervention of the Swedish Ambassador
in Nigeria.
2 Section 5.
23 Basil Ugochukwu, et al., supra note 13. at 10 & 16 and appendices 2 and 6. See also Nigeria's
Judiciary in Distress, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS JOURNAL October - December 1994, at 4.7A(1994) 6 NWLR (pt 351) P. 475.
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Earlier in September 1988, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a well known
Nigerian human rights attorney had his passport seized by the state on
his return from a trip to London. Chief Fawehinmi promptly
commenced an action at the Lagos High Court demanding the release
of his passport. On February 13, 1990, Judge Moni Fafiade ordered
the SSS to return the passport to Chief Fawehinmi. The SSS in return
filed an application for a stay of the execution of the order that the
court refused to grant. Yet the SSS refused to release the passport. A
year later the passport was returned to Chief Fawehinmi not in
deference to the court but "as an act of clemency," according to Alex
Akinyele, who was then the Information Minister.
25
Nevertheless, the seizure of travel passports of Nigerians by agents
of the SSS has not abated. In November 1994, the passport of Nobel
Prize winner for Literature, Professor Wole Soyinka, was impounded
by SSS agents as he tried to board a flight at the airport. Subsequently,
Soyinka attempted to travel with a UN special passport that was also
seized at the airport. He was advised to report at the SSS headquarters
on November 16, 1994. He disregarded the advice and instead left the
country clandestinely to avoid further harassment, and has remained in
self-exile since then.
Similarly, Mr Emma Ezeazu, Executive Director of the
Community Action for Popular Participation, (CAPP), was on Sunday
January 8, 1995, stopped at the airport on his way to London and his
passport seized by SSS agents in a manner indicating that they have
but contempt for the earlier court rulings prohibiting seizure of
citizens' passports.
With the Nigerian courts operating under such crippling constraints
and in the absence of any other independent organs of government to
investigate abuses by SSS agents, gross violations of human rights
continue, and the citizens are generally helpless.
E. Training, Code of Conduct and Discipline
Secrecy tends to characterise the activities of the SSS in Nigeria.
Major aspects of its functions are not open to public scrutiny. Unlike
25 Clement Nwankwo, et al., Nigeria: The Limits of Justice; Constitutional Rights Project, December
1993, at 52.
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the police, men of the SSS wear no uniforms or other common attire.
Government also goes to great extent to shroud their activities in a
mystery out of which impunity and arbitrariness have sprouted.
Whatever code of discipline there may be for SSS operatives is not
accessible to Nigerians. The same cannot be found in any legislation
in force presently, including the National Security Agencies Decree of
1986 that created the SSS. Among internal security forces, matters
relating to discipline and code of conduct are often taught at official
training centres. There, however, appears to be no training centre in
Nigeria catering specifically to the manpower needs of the SSS. Most
of the operatives join the service from any of the three arms of the
military or from the special branch of the police. In this case, since
they retain their positions in these services even after joining the SSS,
they are bound by the codes of these other services.
In the past, questions have been asked about the training
programme of these services and whether they have any human rights
training in Nigeria. Though the country has signed and ratified some
of the major international human rights instruments, there has been no
government commitment to enforce the provisions of these
instruments. Even the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
which was enacted into domestic legislation, is being resisted by
government. On at least one occasion, the dictatorship of Babangida
made a decree that dispensed with the application of the Charter.26
Internal security forces in Nigeria, including the SSS, approach
their duties from a perception that any practice which affronts the law
enforcement and internal security function should be dispensed. There
is no evidence that operatives are exposed to the various United
Nations standards on law enforcement, such as the UN Code of
Conduct for the Police. The various international instruments in this
regard, which should provide binding obligations, do not form part of
the training curriculum. Human rights abuses by SSS operatives are
seen by them not as evidence of irresponsibility but as a necessary
outcome from the imperative of state security. Disciplinary processes
2 On July 21, 1993, Babangida signed into law the Lands (Title Vesting Etc.) Decree No. 52 which
provided in Section 6 (3) that "For the purposes of this section, the question whether any provision of...
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Reinforcement) Act has been, is
being or would be contravened by anything done, being done or proposed to be done in pursuance of this
decree shall not be inquired into by any court of law or tribunal".
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regarding improper exercise of powers leading to the denial of rights
are therefore non-existent. Erring operatives are never known to be
sanctioned in spite of the widespread and institutionalised nature that
they cause. Instead, operatives have been punished in the past for
failing to perpetrate abuses.
In January 1995, three SSS agents were sacked by the government
for alleged negligence. They were punished for failing in their task of
monitoring the movement of Alani Akinrinade, a retired army general
and pro-democracy activist who has since gone into exile.2' That
Akinrinade was able to escape into exile was interpreted as
inefficiency and negligence on the part of the operatives, leading to
their dismissal.
F. Corruption
There is no specific legal requirement to punish acts of corruption
by authorities of the SSS which may manifest as perversion of the
course of inquiries or by officers allowing their personal interests to
interfere with their public responsibilities. Even among the civil
society, Nigeria's corruption laws are weak and ineffective. Graft and
avarice have blossomed unabated in the country. It is improbable that
the SSS will be an oasis of rectitude in such a society.
Recently, the United States based Columbia Broadcasting System,
(CBS), produced a sixty-minute documentary on Nigeria which gave
an insight into the level of official corruption in the country. Despite
of the alarming incidence of corruption, perpetrators - mostly
government officials - are rarely punished. The following incident
involving an SSS operative illustrates this situation. The incident
occurred in Ehime Mbano, a local council in Imo State, which is in
eastern Nigeria. Apparently, there was a report to the police by some
villagers concerning repeated acts of stealing involving some known
members of the village. One of the thieves belonged to the same
religious group as the SSS operative attached to the local council. The
thief reported the incident to the SSS operative, who, under the
protection of his office, proceeded to harass the villagers and
intimidate them to withdraw their complaint to the police. A petition
When Will Abacha Go? NEWSWATCH. January 23, 1995, at 10.
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which the villagers sent to the state SSS director to call the operative
to order was disregarded. Instead, the authorities sought to protect
him.
G. Superior Orders
There is no provision in the law creating the SSS that enjoins
subordinates to disobey superior orders where such orders will lead to
abuse of human rights. Rather, operatives tend to execute all orders
emanating from their superiors notwithstanding their impact on rights
and freedoms. Often when operatives are openly challenged to show
authority before their requests are granted or their orders obeyed, they
reply vaguely by implying that their action has been ordered "from
above." "Above" can mean any authority from an SSS director to
military governor, top military officers, Head of State, minister or even
powerful individuals in society. The case of Akinrinade above shows
clearly that even inadvertent failure to execute official acts leading to
human rights violation can be punished severely making it unlikely
that superior orders can be disobeyed by subordinates even for all the
human rights in the world.
H. Criminal Liability
Under Nigeria's criminal laws, all crimes committed within the
country are punishable irrespective of by whom such crimes are
committed. In respect of internal security forces entitled to use force,
Section 298 of the criminal Code provides that "any person authorised
by law to uses force is criminally responsible for any excess, according
to the nature and quality of the act which constitutes the excess." In
reality, the SSS in Nigeria seems to operate outside the regime of the
criminal law. There is no known case of an SSS operative ever going
through a criminal prosecution in spite of the fact that SSS operations
often lead to violent crimes.
The Constitution authorises the federal and state attorneys general
to commence and maintain criminal prosecution against any person
before any court of law in Nigeria in respect of offences created by
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federal and state laws, respectively. 28 There is, however, in Nigeria
general disinterest on the part of the justice ministries to prosecute
crimes committed by officials of the government.
With respect to the SSS, on October 19, 1986, Mr Dele Giwa, a
front-line Nigerian print journalist, was killed by a bomb as he tried to
open a parcel allegedly sent from the office of the "C-in-C"
(Commander in Chief). Hours before his death, Giwa had met with
various government officials including a deputy director of the SSS.
He was actually interrogated concerning allegations that he was a
"socialist revolutionary" and was also importing arms for the purposes
of violent insurrection.
A few weeks after Giwa's death, the SSS deputy director,
Lieutenant Colonel Kunle Togun, met with some journalists in Lagos.
He informed the journalists that at a seminar on security organised
earlier in the month for media executives and security agencies, a
compromise was reached that editors would inform the SSS of any
story they considered detrimental to government interests. "I mean we
came to a real agreement and one person cannot just come out and
blackmail us. I am an expert in blackmail," 29 Togun fumed. This
pointed to official complicity in Giwa's murder. Nevertheless, no
attempt was made by the authorities to prosecute the murderers. Gani
Fawehinmi, Giwa's attorney and friend, later commenced a private
criminal proceeding to prosecute the SSS operatives allegedly
involved in the killing. The then Lagos State Attorney General, Mrs.
Eniola Fadayomi, whose office it was to handle the prosecution,
initially declined but later decided to commence criminal proceedings
which was ultimately bungled because of the perfunctory manner in
which it was handled. A purported police inquiry into Giwa's
gruesome death also collapsed because the police lacked the will to
investigate.
L Civil Liability
Section 6 (6) of the 1979 Constitution vests in the courts in Nigeria
powers to determine disputes between persons or between a person
29 Sections 160 (1) and 191 (1) of the 1979 Constitution.
29 Pin in a Bomb-Stack, supra note 18.
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and any authority of government as to their various civil rights and
obligations, Chapter Four30 of the Constitution sets out these rights.
They include most of those secured by the International Bill of Human
Rights. Furthermore, Section 42(1) of the Constitution provides that
any person who alleges that any of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution has been or is threatened may apply to a High Court for
redress. Generally, any person whose rights are violated by the SSS
agents in the course of their duties has a cause of action and can seek
legal redress and in the case of an unlawful detention, in addition to
damages, a public apology from the violator.
However, as has been discussed earlier, the ability of the courts to
provide redress for the many abuses caused by the SSS has been
diminished by a plethora of Draconian military decrees which also
remove the powers of the courts to entertain such questions. Also
several extraneous social and economic factors influence the ability of
victims of abuses to seek redress. It is generally believed that the
Nigerian judiciary has squandered its credibility and this is a severe
disincentive to the challenge of human rights violations. Even where a
litigant succeeds against the SSS, the law in Nigeria is that he cannot
enforce the judgement without the authorisation of the Attorney
General. This authorisation is rarely given. Most of the victims are
therefore often frustrated even after winning their cases and are -left
without remedy.
J. Powers of the Legislature and Other Bodies
The powers of the Provisional Ruling Council, PRC, (the nominal
law making body of the Abacha dictatorship) over the activities of the
SSS is severely limited. The nature and extent of its powers to control
actions of the service is also unknown. Even so, the Head of State,
having acquired powers to meddle at will with the composition of the
Council, obviously operates above it. There is thus presently in
Nigeria no legislature properly so-called as all decrees are issued in the
name and under the hand of the Head of State.
Besides, there is no independent body with mandate to hear
complaints of a human rights nature. This, however, is without
30 Comprising sections 30 - 42.
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prejudice to the existence of the Public Complaints Commission, the
public ombudsman that investigates allegations of abuse of state power
by officials of government. The commission exists merely on paper;
no meaningful achievements can be ascribed to it. The campaign of
human rights NGOs in Nigeria for the creation of a human rights
commission to independently investigate abuses and sanctions
violators is being officially resisted.
K. Transparency and Access to Records
There is no legal requirement on the SSS to disclose information
concerning arrests and detention when such is demanded nor are they
bound to keep public records of their activities. Nigeria has no
freedom of information law. The secret service nature of the
organisation makes its activities mostly clandestine. In practice, the
SSS operates several unknown detention centres. Even where persons
are arrested it may take days and frustrating off-the-record inquiries
before relatives can actually discover where they are being held. It,
therefore, happens with alarming frequency that persons cannot be
traced after being arrested by the SSS. A case in point is that of Mr
Sylvester Odion-Akhaine, secretary general of the pro-democracy
group, Campaign for Democracy, (CD), who was abducted by SSS
operatives on January 12, 1995 and whose whereabouts was unknown
as of June 7, 1995.
In addition, the SSS uses all kinds of facilities for detention -
dwelling houses, dungeons, prisons and so on - most of them
inaccessible to the public. Lawyers are generally not allowed access to
persons detained by the SSS. Most persons so detained are thus
denied legal advice and other rights. This practice also discourages
monitoring of the activities of the SSS.
The culture of secrecy also exemplifies the prevailing parochialism
in role perception by the organisation's operatives, who seem to derive
morbid pleasure from the assumed fact that their activities are outside
the reach of law and public scrutiny. Even the most enlightened
sections of the society are therefore discouraged from efforts to insist
on the strict accountability of SSS officers.
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L. Rights of Civil Society to Monitor ISFs
Public access to information concerning the activities of the SSS in
Nigeria is grossly constrained. This undermines the monitoring of its
activities by the press, individuals and non-governmental
organisations. This notwithstanding, the media in Nigeria have played
and continue to play a crucial role in the monitoring of the SSS.
The Nigerian Constitution of 1979 provides in section 21 that the
media should uphold the fundamental objectives of the Constitution
and also upholds the responsibility and accountability of the
government to the people. Furthermore, section 36 (1) of the same
Constitution guarantees for every person the freedom of expression,
including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas
and information without interference. However, the Constitution does
not give the press any protection towards the execution of its
constitutional obligations. In fact it has been held that there is nothing
in the Constitution to support the contention that the press forms the
fourth arm of government. "The right to freedom of expression under
section 36 is one which belongs to all who have to hold opinion,
receive and impart ideas, or disseminate information and contemplates
no separate treatment to the mass media."'3 Nigeria has no freedom of
information law. Much of the information available in the media on
the activities of the SSS are hardly sourced officially but are received
from friends, colleagues or relatives of victims. In addition, there exist
in the books obsolete laws, like the Official Secrets Act, which hinder
the free flow of information.
There are other legal and extra-legal constraints on the monitoring
of the SSS particularly by the media. Critical stories in the press on
the activities of the SSS may elicit stringent reprisals including
physical occupation and sealing up of premises. Several laws restrict
press freedom as do harassment, arrest and detention of journalists and
the promulgation of arbitrary decrees. 32
31 Per Philip Mnaemeka Agu JCA in Tony Momoh v Senate of the National Assembly (1984) A
NCLR 269.
32 As at the time of writing this report, three major national media organisations, The Guardian,
Punch and Concord were under armed occupation by security agents while no fewer than seven journalists
were being detained without trial.
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Non-governmental human rights organisations also operate under
these constraints. However, these inhibitions have not affected their
reporting and denunciations of human rights violations by the SSS. In
fact, the Nigerian human rights community has offered the most
concerted challenge to the abuse of state authority by SSS agents.
They have intervened several times in the past on behalf of victims and
achieved some victories using the strategies of litigation in the law
courts, campaigns and opinion mobilisation. The few positive results
that have been recorded were won against debilitating odds showing
that they arose more from the creativity and doggedness of these
NGOs than from any official policies.
M. Patterns of Human Rights Abuses by the SSS
The "above-the-law" public perception of the SSS has, over the
years, inculated in its operatives some institutional and dispositional
traits that derogate from universal human rights standards. Part of this
disposition consists in a prior presumption that human rights and the
protection of state security are incompatible. This is interpreted
generally to mean that strict adherence to the demands of human rights
will not make for effective guarantee of state security or the imperative
of law enforcement.
Acting out this fallacy, the Nigerian SSS has disregarded the fact
that the preservation of state security is a collective responsibility and
that there is a role for every member of society in bringing this about.
According to Takaya33 "under normal circumstances the primary
responsibility of a country's intelligence is to the nation and not to any
particular individuals or regime. However, where the interest and
security of the nation is equated with the interest and security of those
who wield governmental power... the intelligence agency tends to
develop a distorted view of its role as that of protecting the ruling elite
from the society."
Reports on the activities of the SSS in Nigeria evidence a
continuing pattern of arbitrary use of powers that result in gross human
rights abuses. These abuses have shown a consistent pattern taking
mostly the forms highlighted as follows:
3 Supra note 2.
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N. Killings
The callous murder of front-line journalist, Mr Dele Giwa, in
October 1986 in circumstances evidently pointing to SSS complicity
has already been referred to. This is perhaps the extreme to which
violations of human rights by the SSS can get. That the society was
made aware of this incident was apparently because of the popularity
of the personality involved. The clandestine nature of SSS operations
ensures that even where persons are killed, no clues are left behind and
most of the cases never get reported in the press.
0. Arbitrary Arrest and Detentions
Over the years the SSS has acquired powers of both arrest and
detention. The mode of arrests in the majority of cases do not conform
with legal procedure as no warrants are shown and victims may not be
informed about the reason for their arrest. On December 15, 1987, key
officials of the Nigerian Labour Congress including its President, Ali
Ciroma, General Secretary, Lasisi Osunde, Treasurer, Stephen
Oshadipe, and Chief Information Officer, Sauisu Mohammed, were
arrested without a warrant by SSS operatives in Lagos and detained for
several weeks without bail over a national campaign against feared
increases in the price of petroleum products by the government. The
SSS on June 17, 1989, broke up a seminar on Alternative Structural
Adjustment Programme and arrested the convener of the seminar,
Chief Gani Fawehinmi, as well as social critic, Dr. Tai Solarin, and
veteran labour leader, Chief Michael Imoundu. While Solarin and
Imoudu were released the following day, Fawehinmi was detained for
four months and a day at Gashua, a remote prison in Northern Nigeria.
Gbenga Olawepo, a mass communication student in his final year
at the University of Lagos, and a Public Relations Officer of the
National Association of Nigerian Students, (NANS), were arrested in
Lagos on September 19, 1989, by SSS agents for alleged "espionage
activities." Olawepo was detained at an SSS cell for over a year
without trial for delivering a speech at the 13th World Festival of
Youths and Students in North Korea, which the Nigerian authorities
considered embarrassing. He alleged, upon release, following a court
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order, that he was tortured by SSS agents to force him to confess to
various crimes.
Earlier on August 12, 1989, Mr Etim Etim, a journalist with The
Guardian, was invited by the SSS to their offices in Lagos. He
reported on August 16, and for three months thereafter he was detained
without bail. He was informed during interrogation that his name had
been mentioned in the course of their investigation into how classified
information had been leaking to the press, and was accused of "being
an agent for foreign interests."
P. Travel Restrictions
It is not uncommon for Nigerians whose views are contrary to
those of the government to be stopped at the airport by SSS agents and
their passports seized. It is a widely known fact that the SSS maintains
dockets at the nation's major international airports which are fed with
the names of alleged enemies of government who must be prevented
from travelling out of the country at all costs, lest they go out to
embarrass the government.
34
On July 8, 1994, in a landmark judgement, the Nigerian Court of
Appeal, sitting in Lagos, decided that the federal government has no
discretionary power to withhold, withdraw or revoke a citizen's
passport. The court ruled that a citizen's possession of a passport is a
constitutional right, not a privilege and that the seizure of such
passport amounts to a violation of the right to freedom of movement.
However, two days after this ruling, SSS agents impounded the
passport of Chief Sobo Sowemimo, a Senior Advocate of Nigeria and
a member of the National Democratic Coalition, who was on his was
to Britain to attend his daughter's convocation ceremony. On
September 22, 1994, Professor Wole Soyinka was stopped on his way
3 In a counter affidavit sworn to by an SSS official in a case filed by Chief Gani Fawehinmi in 1990,
the official deposed as follows:
for the effective performance of its statutory duties, the organisation maintains a
record of persons considered as risks to the national security by virtue of their
activities whether in Nigeria or abroad...and the government may direct in the
interest of national security that such persons should not be allowed to travel out of
Nigeria where there is reason to believe that such trips may be inimical to national
security based on available intelligence reports."
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to Hamburg, Germany; Mr. Opeyemi Bamidele was prevented from
travelling to the United States on October 16th of that same year.
On April 10, 1995, Chief Gani Fawehinmi was stopped at the
airport by SSS agents on his way to London for a medical operation, in
spite of an earlier court order directing that he be allowed to travel.
On May 2nd and for the second time in as many weeks, Fawehinmi
was again halted at the airport. Armed with a subsequent court order
permitting him to travel, he arrived at the airport and was immediately
surrounded by eight SSS operatives. He was told by one of the
operatives that he cannot travel because an order had been sent down
from Abuja not to allow him out of the country as he was a danger to
the political interests of the government.
Q. Illegal Searches
The Nigerian SSS has arrogated to itself the power to invade
premises at the slightest impulse and to search for "subversive
documents." Most of the searches are conducted illegally and without
warrant. On February 26, 1993, the national headquarters of the Civil
Liberties Organisation, (CLO), was raided by a team of SSS operatives
who came in search of alleged "subversive documents." The operation
which lasted for about four hours was later extended to the
organisation's annex office in Surlere, Lagos, and the residence of the
CLO President, Mr. Olisa Agbakoba, in Ikoyi. In addition, on July 10
of the same year, a team of SSS operatives stormed the Lagos
residence of Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, Chairman of Campaign for
Democracy, (CD). The operatives claimed to be searching for Chima
Ubani, Secretary of CD. The agents damaged doors and lockers and
removed files and documents as well as used computer diskettes and
printouts. A search warrant was never tendered for either the search or
the removal of the above items.
R. Campaigns against the Press
The Nigerian press has been the victim of violent reprisals in the
exercise of intelligence and security powers by the SSS. The
campaign of the Service against the press has great ramifications. It
may be in the form of armed and forceful closure of business premises,
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in which case the organisations concerned are prohibited from printing
and circulating. Publications considered offensive by the government
may also be seized at the printer's or snatched from vendors in the
streets.
Between 1993 and 1994 alone, the media industry in Nigeria lost
no fewer than 1.5 million copies of various publication alleged by the
authorities to be offensive.
On January 2, 1994, over 50,000 copies of TELL magazine were
seized at gunpoint by SSS operatives in the offices of Academy Press,
printers of the magazine. The edition titled: "Return of Tyranny:
Abacha Bares his Fangs," analysed ten new decrees issued by the
military dictatorship most of which curtailed constitutionally
guaranteed rights and took away the jurisdiction of the courts. When
Constitutional Rights Project, (CRP), filed an action in court
challenging the seizure, lawyers to the government swore an oath that
they had been informed by SSS authorities that if the said edition of
TELL magazine had been allowed to circulate, it would have
undermined the internal security of Nigeria and cause a breakdown of
law and order.
In addition to the above, the SSS also executes a programme of
deliberate misinformation on behalf of the government to discredit the
independent media. On July 5, 1994, the management of TSM, a
national news and general interest magazine, alerted the nation about
the circulation of fake editions of the magazine. They had done a
public opinion poll on the annulled 1993 presidential election and
came out with a bold verdict: "Abacha Must Go" which was the
cover of their volume 9, No. 24 edition. Operatives of the SSS, who
appeared to have had prior knowledge of this, quickly printed and
smuggled into the market their own edition with a new title which
read: "Only Abacha Can Save Nigeria."
A similar alarm was raised on July 15, 1994, by the publishers of
TEMPO over the fake edition titled: "Awoists Dump Abiola," which
they said was a crude imitation of the authentic edition. They accused
the SSS of being responsible for this "fake" publication.
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S. General Harassment
The almost limitless powers of the SSS have led to an almost
limitless concept of the powers of its operatives. Sometime in 1987,
the Babangida dictatorship created a panel to investigate the cause of a
crisis in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, which led to the shooting
and death of several students by law enforcement agents. The panel
accused lecturers in the university of not teaching "what they are paid
to teach" 35 and recommended that the government should follow up
this accusation. Government promptly swung into action. SSS agents,
disguised as students, invaded the universities, monitoring teachers
and students and filing reports to the authorities. In March 1988, the
surveillance operation claimed the first victim. Without prior warning,
Dr Patrick Wilmot, a political science lecturer at the Ahmadu Bello
University, Zaria was deported to London by the SSS in violation of
his rights and personal security. Officially, he was accused of spying
for the then apartheid regime in South Africa and also of being
"radical and Marxist."
T. Treatment of Prisoners
Prisoners in Nigeria, whether detained for preventive purposes,
convicted of crime or awaiting trial, are generally poorly treated.
Often they lack the basic necessities of life, are shut out from society,
denied medical care and access to the outside. Victims of the SSS who
are mainly held for expressing strong political opinions fare even
worse because they are seen mostly as political hostages.
In June 1991, for example, the police and SSS authorities in Lagos
announced the arrest of no fewer than 200 students activists all over
the country. Most of the arrested students were detained in very
inhuman conditions while some reported being tortured by their
interrogators. They were all held under the State Security (Detention
of Persons) Decree No. 2 of 1984. In a save-our-soul letter, smuggled
out by the detained students at the time, they alleged as follows:
35See ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN AFRICA 43 (1991).
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Some of us... where slapped and beaten to unconsciousness by men
of the State Security Service, SSS at their offices at Ibadan and
Ikeja respectively. [Another] was handcuffed and chained to his
cell windows while being beaten at the Jos SSS office. We were
all brought to Lagos later and detained at the SSS interrogation
centre. For most of the time we were deliberately underfed and
denied drinking water. When we could not longer cope with the
maltreatment by the SSS at the Ikyoi interrogation centre, we
embarked on an indefinite hunger strike.36
There is a deliberate practice of the SSS not to keep detainees with
common interests together. Rather they are scattered often amongst
suspected robbers, murderers and rapists who have clear instructions
from the SSS to continuously assault their more vulnerable colleagues
physically and mentally.37 Detainees are held in narrow, poorly
ventilated cells and made to sleep on the bare floor. They are denied
access to legal and medical advice and the comfort of friends and
relations.38
U. Discrimination and the Treatment of Women
Discrimination by the SSS reflects the class structure of the
Nigerian society. Wealthy and influential members of the society are
generally better treated in detention than ordinary citizens. There are
practically different levels of custodial facilities and people are taken
into them according to their assumed worth in society. There is no
legislation prohibiting preferential treatment and discrimination among
detainees and it has come to be accepted as normal practice. It is
instructive that SSS intelligence activities are directed in the main
against the so-called enemies of government. Those in the
government are considered safe and unlikely to sabotage government
interests or threaten state security.
The SSS in Nigeria has exhibited utter gender blindness. Women
are treated much the same way as their male counterparts.
36 The Plights of Nigerian Students, CONSTITUT1ONAL RIGHTs JOURNAL. July to September 1991. at
10.
37
38 See generally BEHIND THE WAL, (1991) (Published by the Civil Liberties Organisation [CLO],
Lagos).
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On March 5, 1995, editor-in-chief and publisher of The Sunday
Magazine, (TMS), Mrs. Chris Anyanwu, was arrested and taken away
by security agents at the same time that the magazine's editor, Mr
Comfort Obi, was being hunted by SSS operatives. After her release,
Mrs. Anyanwu was arrested again in early June and was held
incommunicado for several weeks without bail.
Earlier on June 20, 1994, Mrs. Mee Mofe-Damijo, publisher of
Weekend Classique, was arrested by SSS operatives at the Murtala
Mohammed International Airport on her way to a conference in Paris.
At the SSS detention camp in Shangisha, Lagos, Mrs. Damijo was
questioned over a Weekend Classique story titled: "Junior Officers
Attack Abacha" and asked to reveal the source of her information
concerning divisions among the junior ranks of the army as reported in
the paper.
III. CONCLUSION
This report on the SSS in Nigeria has featured one recurring fact:
the SSS is an instrument of continued and unabashed military
dictatorship. The traits of ISFs operating under military or "outlaw"
governments will necessarily differ from those operating under
constitutional and democratic conditions.
Having regard to the code proposed by Professor James Paul, it is
obviously futile to expect that its goals can be realised under any form
of dictatorship, military or not. They can be achieved only in a
democratic setting with all assurances of popular consultation,
transparency, guarantees for enforceable human rights and strong,
independent sanction organs of government.
The SSS, as it exists today in Nigeria, is a threat to the enjoyment
of human rights by the ordinary citizens. The law setting up the
organisation has critical shortcomings; it vests absolute powers and
control in an unaccountable Head of State and in operatives driven by
a brutal desire to protect the regime despite the cost and break all
opposition.
39 Annual Report on Human Rights Violations In Nigeria. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTs JOURNAL 18
(1995).
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Consequently, all action should be geared towards replacing the
existing political structure with a constitutional, democratic order.
This will enable attention to the principles enunciated in the code.

